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MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE IN 
AUSTRALIAN LISTED COMPANIES1 
 
Abstract 
How many directorships are too many?  Globally, normative advice emphasises the 
importance of limiting the number of directorships any individual should hold due to 
the workloads they entail.  However, there is little empirical evidence to support this 
view.  Rather, there is a strong tradition of supporting multiple directorships as a 
mechanism for the firm to co-opt external resources.  To explore the issue of director 
workloads and multiple directorships, we first consider the issues related to multiple 
directorships and outline the conclusions of extant international and Australian studies 
into multiple directorships.  We then detail our objectives in undertaking this research 
and our approach to data collection.   
 
Our findings indicate that the incidence of multiple directorships in Australian listed 
companies is low.  We also find that many of the apparent examples of multiple 
directorships are due to related entities, which share common directors and, due to the 
nature of these entities, have much lower workload requirements.  Further, there does 
not appear to be any relationship between holding multiple directorships and firm 
financial performance.  Finally, we discuss the implications for boards and those 
interested in governance, particularly the need to ensure governance recommendations 
and guidelines reflect empirical findings.  We offer one solution to address the 
concerns of boards, investors, other stakeholders and the community regarding 
multiple directorships: board and individual director evaluations. 
                                                 
1 This paper was presented at the 8th International Conference on Corporate Governance and Board 
Leadership, 11-13 October 2005 at the Centre for Board Effectiveness, Henley Management College. 
  3
Key words:  Boards of directors; multiple directorships; corporate governance
  4
INTRODUCTION 
How many directorships can a person undertake and still perform to the level 
expected of director in the current economic and legal environment? With the 
increasing attention being placed on boards and individual directors in the post-Enron 
environment, this question has major implications for investors, boards and potentially, 
regulators. There are two basic views. On the one hand it can be held that individuals 
themselves and the boards on which they sit are best placed to determine whether an 
individual is “overboarded” and consequently not fully undertaking their appropriate 
role on a particular board. This view is supported by many researchers and 
commentators who can point to several advantages of boards containing directors who 
are linked to other boards. Researchers also question whether this “overboarding” is an 
endemic feature of the modern governance of large publicly listed companies or 
whether the vast majority of public company directors have found an appropriate mix 
of directorships and other activities. 
The other view is put forward by organisations such as the Australian 
Shareholders’ Association (ASA), who claim there is a link between companies with 
difficulties and the workloads of their boards (Galacho, 2004). The ASA focused on 
packaging giant Amcor, the subject of an Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) investigation over cartel activity, as an example of this link.  In 
particular, the ASA highlighted the high workload of four of its seven non-executive 
directors and argued that they had too great a workload given the number of other 
boards on which they sat (Moullakis, 2004).   
The ASA believes that any director who sits on more than five boards is doing 
a disservice to the companies’ shareholders. They are not alone in suggesting 
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directorship limits.  For example, in the United States, the Council of Institutional 
Investors (2004) suggests that directors with a full-time job should not sit on more than 
two other boards and current CEOs should only serve on one other board.  In the 
United Kingdom, the Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2003) 
recommends that full-time executive directors should not take on more than one non-
executive directorship in a FTSE 100 company. Both these US and UK examples are 
concerned with people who hold full-time demanding managerial positions in addition 
to directorships in other companies.  This has been far more a feature of the 
governance regimes in those countries than in Australia. 
Concerns over the workloads that come with multiple directorships are not 
new.  Lipton and Lorsch (1992: 64), for example, stated, “the most widely shared 
problem directors have is lack of time to carry out their duties”.  A US survey of 1279 
directors by Corporate Board Member magazine and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004) 
found that a majority of directors themselves believe there should be a limit on the 
number of other boards on which board members may sit (2 for the CEO and 3 for 
outside directors).   
But are these attacks on so-called “serial” directors warranted?  In this report 
we consider the extent of multiple directorships in companies listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX) and whether there is any relationship between director 
workloads and the performance of the companies they govern. As our report will show, 
there is no empirical evidence to support the ASA’s view on multiple directorships.   
To explore the issue of director workloads and multiple directorships we will 
first consider the issues related to multiple directorships and outline the conclusions of 
extant international and Australian studies into multiple directorships.  We then detail 
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our objectives in undertaking this research and our approach to data collection.  The 
data analysis and findings follow.  These findings indicate that the incidence of 
multiple directorships is the exception, rather than the rule in Australia.  Further, there 
does not appear to be any relationship between holding multiple directorships and firm 
financial performance.  Finally, we discuss the implications for boards and those 
interested in governance, particularly the need to ensure governance recommendations 
and guidelines reflect empirical findings. We suggest an answer is not in arbitrary 
limits for the number of multiple directorships, but rather in boards undertaking and 
acting upon board and individual director evaluations.  
THE ISSUE OF MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS 
Scepticism is naturally evoked when we read of directors serving on multiple 
boards, especially in light of the burgeoning responsibility of the modern director.  
How can an individual possibly monitor, strategise, counsel and generally control five, 
six, seven or more companies?  The answer, of course, is that they do not: directors do 
not govern, boards do.  There is no argument against criticisms founded on evidence of 
directors not applying themselves or not providing valuable service to the companies 
they govern.  However, indiscriminately singling out directors on arbitrary standards 
of directorship holdings cannot be supported with empirical evidence.  In fact, there 
are several important reasons why holding multiple directorships can be good for 
companies and for our economy and society. 
There is an emerging stream of research recognising that boards do more than 
monitor the firms they govern (e.g., Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson, Daily and 
Ellstrand, 1996; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004).  Rather, it is the suite of roles that they 
perform that is important.  And to carry out these roles, a board requires a mix of 
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skills.  Therefore, if we are to examine board effectiveness, we should be examining 
the board as a whole, rather than individual directors.  It is the pool of talent, skills and 
experience that is important (including contacts), because this pool will determine how 
well a board (as a group) carries out its functions.  An individual director can play a 
significant role in a limited area (thus requiring a limited time commitment) or a wider 
more extensive role (requiring a much greater time commitment). 
Policy guidelines which seek to limit multiple directorships also ignore the rich 
tradition of empirical support for the resource dependence role of directors. The 
resource dependence role of directors has long been recognised (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978) and is the role directors play when they use their external contacts and 
reputation to the advantage of the firm which they serve as a director. Examples of this 
role include financiers supplying funds to the firm on the basis of the reputation of 
directors, directors using their contacts to open new markets for the firm or using their 
contacts to assist in securing new technology.  In short, directors holding more than 
one directorship (usually defined as interlocking directors) have been long 
acknowledged as a key way that firms seek to control their external environment and 
access vital resources.   
The Benefits of Multiple Directorships 
Directors holding more than one directorship (defined as interlocking directors 
in the literature) have been long acknowledged as a key way that firms seek to control 
their external environment and access vital resources (Means, 1939).  Quite simply, 
directors can play a vital role in providing the companies they govern with access to 
key resources such as capital.   
  8
The first major study of boards as a device to control their external 
environment was carried out by Selznick (1949), who noted the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA) sought to neutralise strong opposition by bringing representatives of 
the hostile groups onto the TVA’s governing board.  Similarly, Price (1963) and Zald 
(1967) also documented the use of boards as a cooptative device. 
Recently, scholars have examined direct links between various measures of 
firm performance and interlocking behaviour.  For example, Boyd (1990) found that, 
in firms facing greater environmental uncertainty, those with more interlocks (i.e. 
greater number of multiple directorships) exhibited superior performance as measured 
by sales growth and return on equity.   
Directors are thought to be able to use their multiple links to add value in three 
ways.  First, they can act as a co-optive mechanism to extract resources (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989) and obtain support from external stakeholders critical to the 
organisation’s performance.  An example would be where a director has contacts 
which allow the firm access to capital at a more attractive rate than from other sources.  
Second, board members serve as boundary spanners (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) 
providing channels for communicating information to or from the external 
environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  A director may fulfil this role when they 
introduce a value adding governance policy to a firm, having seen it work in another 
company on whose board they sit as a director.  Third, boards are thought to play an 
important role in enhancing organisational legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  This explains the often observed fact that those floating new 
companies seek at least some directors with established business reputations. 
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It is important to recognise that, as with many topics in governance, there is no 
single correct approach.  Advantage may come to a company via a director’s formal 
company linkages (such as providing access to capital, reducing transaction costs 
between companies, addressing firm level interdependencies).  For instance, there 
appears to be a positive relationship between interlocks (i.e. multiple directorships) and 
firm solvency and performance (see Dooley, 1969; Pfeffer, 1972, Pennings, 1980, 
Stockman, Zieglan and Scott, 1985; Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988). 
Alternatively, advantage may come on a personal level (e.g., environment 
scanning, provision of information or access to communication channels). For 
instance, interlocking directors can form a formal firm link aimed at reducing the costs 
of coordination and resource planning (Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983). Hillman, 
Zardkoohi and Bierman (1999) found that firms with links to the US government had 
reduced uncertainty due to improved information flows resulting in greater shareholder 
value.  Similarly, directors with ties to strategically related firms have been found to 
provide better advice and counsel, which is positively related to firm performance 
(Westphal, 1999).   
There is also evidence that multiple directorships benefit firms by increasing a 
firm’s legitimacy (e.g., Daily and Schwenk, 1996; Gales and Kesner, 1994).  Since a 
company’s reputation is linked to that of its board (Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983), 
“prestigious or legitimate persons or organizations represented on the focal 
organization’s board provide confirmation to the rest of the world of the value and 
worth of the organization” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 145). As an example, firms 
with more prestigious boards have been linked with less underpricing at an IPO (Certo, 
2003; Certo, Daily and Dalton, 2001). 
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Turning aside from single company effects, multiple directorships are 
associated with positive effects on the entire corporate system, as interlocking directors 
facilitate the dissemination of innovation through a corporate network (Haunschild and 
Beckman 1998).  For example, firms are more likely to adopt a multidivisional 
structure if they have with ties with previous adopters (Palmer, Jennings and Zhou 
1989).   
With respect to governance in particular, a recent unpublished Canadian study 
is reported to have found that directors serving on the most boards are associated with 
better corporate governance (McFarland, 2004).  The authors (Tim Rowley and Matt 
Fullbrook from the University of Toronto’s Rotman School of Management) conclude 
that directors holding multiple directorships represent: 
...just 1 per cent of the 1,689 directors who sit on the boards of 
companies in Canada's S&P/TSX composite index. They sit on 68 
boards, representing 31 per cent of the index's 223 companies. In 
total, their boards comprise 51 per cent of the market capitalization 
of the benchmark index (McFarland, 2004). 
However, the study found that most of the directors with multiple directorships 
used their influence to diffuse positive corporate governance improvements throughout 
their boards. In fact, most of the boards on which these directors sat received above-
average corporate governance scores in an annual survey of governance of companies 
in the S&P/TSX index conducted by the Rotman School of Management. 
Director Workloads and Multiple Directorships 
The literature on multiple directorships (as they relate to the board’s workload) 
is limited.  Instead there is a rich tradition of studies concentrating on interlocking 
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directorates, in which a director or senior executive of one company sits on the board 
of another company.  As Table 1 shows, Australian studies have overwhelmingly 
concentrated on describing the network of inter-corporate relationships that result from 
multiple directorships rather than the incidence or resultant workloads of such 
directorships. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
As discussed above, interlocking directorates are thought to have positive 
impacts on company performance by providing management with access to a variety 
of key resources.  The significant benefits thought to be associated with appointing 
directors with multiple board positions may also, however, be associated with a 
significant negative – increased workloads for the directors serving on multiple boards.  
Known as “overboarding”, the concern centres on directors who are perceived as 
serving on too many boards (Harris and Shimizu, 2004: 776).  A recent study by Harris 
and Shimizu (2004) on the impact of overboarded directors is one of the few 
systematic studies of the topic, which, though the subject of much complaint in the 
business press both in Australia and internationally (e.g., Dobrzynski, 1996), has been 
largely ignored in academic studies.  Table 2 provides the details of three US studies 
on multiple directorships and board workloads.  It should be noted that the findings 
from these studies do not support the imposition of directorship limits.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this study is to investigate claims that some Australian 
directors hold too many directorships and that this “overboading” is a serious problem. 
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In particular, we aim to inform the current debate by providing data on the extent and 
nature of multiple directorships in listed Australian companies, and the link between 
multiple directorships and firm performance.  It should be noted, however, that our 
study relates only to directorships in ASX-listed companies. It does not take into 
consideration any other positions individual directors may hold, such as their full-time 
positions or seats on the boards of not-for-profit or government business enterprises, as 
this is beyond the scope of our study due to the difficulties involved in collecting 
accurate data for large samples.  The specific objectives of the research are to: 
1. Determine the extent of multiple directorships held by directors of the Top 
100 Australian companies: 
a. within the Top 100 companies 
b. across all listed companies; 
2. Determine the extent of multiple directorships held by directors of the 
companies contained within the largest 200 Australian companies: 
a. within the largest 200 companies 
b. across all listed companies; 
3. Determine the extent of multiple directorships held by directors of all listed 
Australian companies across all listed companies; 
4. Determine the extent of multiple chairmanships held by chairmen of the 
Top 100 Australian companies: 
a. within the Top 100 companies 
b. across all listed companies; 
5. Determine the extent of multiple chairmanships held by directors of the 
companies contained within the largest 200 Australian companies: 
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a. within the largest 200 companies  
b. across all listed companies; 
6. Determine the extent of multiple directorships and chairmanships held by 
chairmen of the largest 200 Australian listed companies across all listed 
companies; and 
7. Determine if any relationship exists between the effective workload of a 
board and a company’s financial performance from an investor’s 
perspective. 
METHODOLOGY 
Our study is based on publicly available archival data. Our original source data 
on directorships was collected from Connect 4 (www.connect4.com.au) in electronic 
form.  Connect 4 specialises in providing information on companies listed on the ASX. 
It purchases this data every year from the ASX and compiles it into a searchable data 
archive that can be downloaded.  
At the time of this study, the directorship data for all listed companies was only 
available till June 2003.  Data beyond this date were fragmented and so our study 
concentrated on directorship data retrieved as of 30 June 2003.  The data collected 
included a list of all ASX-listed companies, the names and positions of the directors of 
these companies and the market capitalisation for each company.  
Although the Connect 4 directorship data is generally accurate, there are 
usually errors in large databases. Common errors included duplicate names of people, 
different spellings of the same name, as well as dated and missing data. To correct 
these data inaccuracies, we ran two checks. First, we reviewed the data and highlighted 
any missing or ambiguous information. Where a company entry contained missing or 
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ambiguous data, we downloaded the annual report from that company’s website and 
updated the information. Since the main focus of the study is the Top 200 companies, 
we also downloaded all annual reports for the ASX Top 200 companies as at June 30 
2003 and manually cross-checked every director entry for these companies.  
We used two sources to collect firm performance data, namely Connect 4 and 
the financial database managed by the Australian Graduate School of Management 
(AGSM) Centre for Research in Finance’s Risk Measurement Service. By employing 
two data sources, we were able to cross-check entries and locate missing data. As 
previously noted, Connect 4 provides information on all ASX-listed companies 
through their “BoardRoom” product.  Our second source of data, the AGSM database 
is a separate source from Connect 4. The AGSM maintains its own archival database 
dating back to January 1974 and it is updated periodically.  
By using the ASX code as a unique identifier, we were able to cross-reference 
the two datasets. This check revealed minor discrepancies in terms of missing 
companies and conflicting data. We resolved these rare conflicts by referring to 
original source data. For instance, some companies were missing market capitalisation 
figures; we calculated this data by obtaining the total number of outstanding shares 
from the company annual reports and multiplying it by closing share price of these 
companies on 30 June 2003. 
In addition to market capitalisation figures, we also collected financial 
performance data, including share prices and dividend per share (DPS). This allowed 
us to calculate the Total Shareholder Return (TSR). We acquired the historical closing 
share prices for the S&P/ASX 200 listed companies as of 30 June 2003 and 2004 from 
the Australian Financial Review (AFR).  We audited this data by randomly checking 
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the AFR prices with those available online from Yahoo Finance 
(http://finance.yahoo.com).  The DPS data was acquired from the Aspect Fin Analysis 
(Huntley’s) database in electronic format. We manually cross-checked this information 
with those published in Shares magazine to clarify any ambiguities.  
We obtained the risk measures (Betas) for different industries represented on 
the ASX from the AGSM. 
Given the size of this database and the fact that this data are inherently “noisy” 
(i.e. the data change frequently and are not always recorded at the source accurately), 
there is likely to be some level of error in the data. However, this level of error is 
unlikely to be such as to change the substantive findings or conclusions of the analysis. 
With the data collected and validated, we created a relational database using 4th 
Dimension (4D) software.  This enabled us to structure and query the data, and run 
initial statistical and financial analyses. More advanced statistical analyses were 
conducted using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). 
Study Measures 
The objectives required us to develop a number of measures. First, we 
developed a series of measures related to multiple directorships and director 
workloads. These were:  
Total Directorships. The total number of directorships held by the board.  This 
variable is calculated for each board and is the sum of all directorships held by 
directors who served on the board at 30 June 2003. 
Board Connectedness. This variable is related to Total Directorships, but takes 
into account the fact that larger boards are naturally more likely to have more 
connections to other boards. This variable was calculated as followed: 
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Board Connectedness = (Total Directorships - Board Size)/Board Size 
Consequently, Board Connectedness can range upwards from zero. A score of 
zero means that all the directors of a company only sit on that one board. The higher 
the Board Connectedness scores the greater the connectedness of the board to other 
ASX-listed companies. 
Board Workload.  This variable measures the total workload of a board using 
the ASA’s guidelines.  While we in no way support the arbitrary limits set by the ASA 
and believe commentators in general should be very careful about making blanket 
policy recommendations for all boards, these limits do provide a convenient measure 
for our study.  Since these guidelines have been given a degree of validity through 
their coverage in the media their soundness should be tested. 
The calculation is based on the ASA’s view that carrying out a director’s duties 
requires a minimum time commitment of 360 hours (45 working days) per year 
(Galacho, 2004).  Additionally, the ASA believes that a chairmanship requires three 
times the effort of a workload, while a deputy chairmanship is equal to two 
directorships.  Thus, all chairman positions were given a workload of three times an 
ordinary director (under the ASA guidelines this equals 1080 hours or 135 working 
days per annum).  Deputy chairmen were given a weighting of two. Consequently, the 
Board Workload variable will be greater than Total Directorships as each chair or 
deputy chair held by any director on that board receives an extra weighting. 
Our analysis also required us to study various categories of firms. We defined 
these categories as follows: 
Top 100 companies. The Top 100 companies refer to those companies with the 
100 largest market capitalisations on 30 June 2003. 
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Top 200 companies. The Top 200 companies refer to those companies with the 
200 largest market capitalisations on 30 June 2003. 
S&P/ASX 200 companies. This grouping of companies is used as the basis for 
studying the relationship between board workload and firm performance. Analysis of 
multiple directorships needs to undertaken at one point in time (for example, 30 June 
2003). In contrast, any analysis seeking to relate multiple directorships with firm 
performance needs to measure that performance over a period of time (for example, 
from 30 June 2003 to 30 June 2004). Consequently, it is necessary to settle upon a 
collection of companies that were traded over a specified period of analysis. We used 
the S&P (Standard & Poor’s)/ASX 200 as the base for determining the companies 
included in this analysis. 
The S&P/ASX 200 is used by investment managers as a benchmark for “a 
portfolio characterised by sufficient size and liquidity” (ASX, 2004). It comprises the 
S&P/ASX 100 plus an additional 100 stocks.  Because 26 companies were either 
delisted after 1 July 2003 or were listed after 30 June 2004, our S&P/ASX 200 
category comprised 174 entities representing the major companies on the ASX which 
were listed at 30 June 2003 and which are included in Standard & Poor’s index at the 
end of 2004. 
All listed entities. This category refers to all companies listed and traded on the 
ASX as at 30 June 2003 for which we could collect both board and market 
capitalisation data. The number is slightly fewer than ASX-listed companies because 
some companies were suspended from trading, some companies’ data for that date is 
incomplete and so on. As discussed in the results section, we collected data on 1250 of 
the 1425 listed entities. 
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Corporate groups.  A feature of some ASX-listed companies is that although 
they are separate legal and listed entities, they form part of a corporate group.  Our 
criterion for a corporate group was that if two or more companies have 50 percent or 
more overlap of directors, it is part of a corporate group and should be counted as one 
entity for studying multiple directorships. This is based on the premise that although 
these directors are sitting on multiple boards, they are essentially catering to the needs 
of one corporate group. Their presence on the board of a related entity will be the 
result of their seat on the parent company’s board and these directors will have 
different workload requirements to those directors who sit on boards of distinct and 
unrelated entities.  For example, an executive director on the board of a related trust 
company may only have to attend only one or two board meetings a year for that trust 
company.  Thus, we report the data for individual companies first before using 
corporate groups to highlight the impact they have on the results.  As we discuss 
below, corporate groups are of particular import when we consider the workload of 
chairmen. 
Finally, we needed to calculate financial performance for the S&P/ASX 200. 
We calculated an investor focused measure of firm financial performance as follows: 
Risk Adjusted Total Shareholder Return.  Risk adjusted total shareholder return 
measures the total return shareholders would receive if they held a company’s share 
from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004. This return is equal to the increase (decrease) in 
share price plus any dividends received (where the closing date for dividend payment 
was within this period). This unweighted return is weighted for risk using industry 
betas for the year.  This reflects the risk profile of industries, a factor that should be 
considered when comparing firm performance from an investment perspective. 
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DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
The ASX-Listed Companies 
We were able to collect data on 1326 companies out of the total population of 
1425 companies listed on the ASX as at 30 June 2003. The total number of ASX-listed 
companies (1425) includes foreign companies, counts stapled securities as more than 
one entity and includes corporations with no quoted securities (or debt securities only). 
Furthermore, it also includes some temporary duplications arising from mergers and 
acquisitions of listed companies.  
Of the 1326 for which we collected data, 76 companies did not have market 
capitalisation data.  Since the data pertain to 30 June 2003, some companies were 
suspended from trading on that day, some companies had partial unbalanced accounts, 
for some, accounts were not updated by the ASX and the information was still being 
processed, and a few companies had been delisted but still appeared on the Connect 4 
database. Removing these anomalies meant our study covered 1250 companies.  Our 
dataset (1250 out of 1425 listed entities in 2003) held a combined market capitalisation 
of $724 billion.  
Analysis of the Top 200 companies reveals that the exchange is heavily skewed 
towards large companies. Of the three groups of companies reported in this study, the 
Top 100 companies comprised 88 percent of the exchange’s market capitalisation, the 
Top 200 95 percent, while the 174 companies represented in the S&P/ASX 200 
grouping represented 78 percent of the total market capitalisation. The S&P/ASX 200 
represents a lower proportion of the exchange than either the Top 100 or Top 200 
companies, because, for reasons explained previously, this group included only 174 
companies. In addition, the S&P/ASX 200 does not include some major listed entities 
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which have their primary listing on another exchange or which are investment entities 
such as property trusts. Consequently, while these entities are included in our analysis 
of the directors of the Top 100 and 200 companies they are excluded from the analysis 
of workload and firm performance. 
Table 3 highlights that board size varies with company size – the larger the 
company, the larger the board. Across the ASX, board size averaged 5.7, while among 
the Top 100 firms it averaged 8.2. These figures correspond to previous Australian 
studies (see Arthur, 2001; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Stapledon and Lawrence, 1996). 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The Extent of Multiple Directorships across Individual Companies 
Results on the incidence of multiple directorships are presented in three 
categories: the Top 100, Top 200 and all listed companies.  We also provide a within-
category analysis of multiple directorship holdings for the Top 100 and 200 
companies.  This within-category analysis shows the number of multiple directorships 
held within the Top 100 and Top 200 respectively. This approach highlights the extent 
of multiple directorship holdings among Australia’s major listed companies.  Findings 
are presented in tabulated form, followed by a brief discussion of the key points for 
each table. 
Table 4 presents the results for multiple directorships within Australia’s Top 
100 companies held by individuals sitting on the boards of Top 100 listed entities.  
There are 824 directorships (an average of 8.2 per company) held by 656 individuals.  
It is clear from this table that there is a relatively low level of multiple directorship 
holdings within Australia’s Top 100 companies.  Of 656 individuals, 534 (81 percent) 
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held only one directorship and another 85 individuals (13 percent) held two 
directorships.  Only one individual held five or more directorships within the Top 100 
companies, a fact which is associated with membership of a “corporate group” and 
which will be discussed later. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Directors of the Top 100, however, are in demand outside the Top 100 
category.  The incidences of multiple directorships of individuals sitting on ASX Top 
100 companies across all listed entities are shown in Table 5.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
The table highlights that these 656 directors held a total of 1209 directorships 
(or an average of 1.8 directorships each).  However, this workload is not evenly 
spread.  Fifty eight percent of the Top 100 directors held only one directorship in a 
listed company.  A further 130, or 20 percent of individuals, held only two 
directorships.  Only 31 (4.8 percent) individuals held five or more directorships across 
all listed companies. Again membership of a “corporate group” is behind many of 
these multiple directorships. 
Results of the analysis of the Top 200 companies are reported in Tables 6 and 
7.  Table 6 presents the directorships held by individuals within the Top 200 
companies by market capitalisation at 30 June 2003.  Similar to the results of the Top 
100, the Top 200 also shows low levels of multiple directorships.  Of the 1178 
directors, 955 individuals hold only the one directorship (81 percent) and 131 (11 
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percent) of individuals held two directorships within the Top 200.  Only 7 individuals 
(0.6 percent) held five or more directorships within the Top 200 listed companies. 
 
INSERT TABLES 6 and 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results for the Top 200 companies across all listed entities are shown in 
Table 7.  Again, Table 7 reports relatively low levels of multiple directorships.  Of 
1178 directors, 976 held one or two directorships (83 percent) and only 35 individuals 
(3 percent) held five or more directorships across all listed companies. 
Turning to the analysis of all listed companies in 2003, the results remain 
highly consistent with our earlier findings of the Top 100 and Top 200 categories. 
Results are shown in Table 8.   
Table 8 reveals an average of 1.3 directorships per person. Of 5468 individuals, 
4317 (79 percent) held one directorship, while a further 734 (13 percent) held two 
directorships.  Among the “big linkers”, those holding five or more directorships are 
only 68 (1 percent) directors. This 1 percent of directors held 398 directorships (5.4 
percent) out of the total of 7344 directorship on the exchange. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Multiple Chairmanships 
We now present the results of multiple chairmanships that individuals held in 
2003 for the Top 100 and Top 200 companies. We compare the levels of 
chairmanships within the Top 100 and 200 companies as well as the extent to which 
these chairmen held other chairman positions across all listed companies.  We do this 
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for chair only positions and then also take into account workloads where a chairman 
also holds other non-chair directorships. 
As shown in Table 9, 12 people hold either two or three chairmanships in Top 
100 companies. The remaining 73 chairmen chaired a single Top 100 company. 
 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
As with directors, chairmen of the Top 100 are in demand when all listed 
companies are examined.  Table 10 reports the level of multiple chairmanships for the 
Top 100 companies, across all listed entities in 2003.  Of the 85 individuals who held 
the position of chairman, 51 (60 percent) hold only one chair position. Two individuals 
(2 percent) held five or more chairmanships across all listed companies.  
 
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
Similar to our earlier findings, these results remain consistent when we analyse 
the levels of chairmanships for the Top 200 ASX-listed companies, as shown in Tables 
11 and 12. 
 
INSERT TABLES 11 AND 12 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 11 present chairmanships for individuals who were on the boards of Top 
200 companies and held multiple chairmanships within the Top 200 listed companies 
in 2003. The results clearly show significantly low levels of multiple chairmanships as, 
of 166 individuals, only 26 (16 percent) held two or more chairmanships.  This 
situation changes when the multiple chairmanships for the Top 200 companies are 
analysed across all ASX-listed entities. 
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Table 12 presents the levels of multiple chairmanships for the Top 200 listed 
companies across all listed entities in 2003. The results demonstrate a reasonably low 
level of multiple chairmanships as only 52 individuals (29 percent) held two or more 
chairmanships. 
Table 13, which shows the total number of positions held by the chairmen of 
the Top 200 companies, demonstrates the importance of governance knowledge and 
board interlocks among these senior company directors. While one third hold only the 
one position on any listed company, a further 29 percent hold two positions while 15 
percent hold three positions. Twenty three percent hold four or more such positions.  
 
INSERT TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE 
 
Do a few chairmen have the heavy work loads as suggested by Tables 11, 12 
and 13? While one director may appear to be holding a large number of chairmanships 
(9), it is a considerable overstatement of his actual commitment when consideration is 
given to the corporate group involved.  An examination of the actual companies this 
person chairs reveals they are all related to one corporate group, of which this director 
is the executive chairman. Many of these listed entities are trusts which are related to 
the parent company while listed on the ASX as separate entities. Consequently, it can 
be argued that this represents a significantly lower workload and one which represents 
a full-time position for the individual. 
The same rationale applies to the other chairmen who at first glance appear to 
chair four or more companies. In each case these chairmen are chairing companies 
related in a corporate group, often property trusts which are related to a single 
operating company. An examination of the actual loads taken by these six people who 
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nominally chair four or more listed entities shows that in one case one person chairs 
three separate entities, another two entities while the remainder only effectively chair 
one entity.  A similar explanation occurs when reviewing some of those directors with 
a significant number of positions. A number of these people hold positions on groups 
of related companies. Significant examples can be seen in the entities associated with 
the Macquarie Bank, Deutsche Bank and Westfield Holdings.  Such groups are 
characterised by common directors and often common chairmen. 
Multiple Directorships and Firm Performance 
An important objective of the study was to observe if there is any relationship 
between the workload of a board and firm performance. As noted above, we calculated 
three variables to measure the slightly different facets of the impact of the number of 
directorships held by directors on a board. These are: 
• Total Directorships – the total number of directorships in ASX-listed 
entities of the directors sitting on a board; 
• Board Connectedness – an index which takes into account the impact of 
board size; and 
• Board Workload – the total workload of the board using the Australian 
Shareholders’ Association Guidelines that a chairmanship is equal to three 
directorships and a deputy chairmanship is equal to two directorships. 
The measure of firm performance is Total Shareholder Return weighted for risk 
(wTSR), which shows the return an investor received holding the share for a year 
through movement in share price plus dividend and controlling for industry risk.  The 
period for the analysis is the 2003-04 financial year, with the board workload measures 
being at the end of June 2003. The population of interest is those companies in the 
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S&P/ASX Top 200 index at the end of 2004 that were in existence over the period of 
analysis. 
The boards ranged between 4 and 15 directors with an average of 7.5 directors.  
The total number of directorships held by directors on a board, including the board 
they sat on, ranged from 4 to 38 with a mean of 15. However, the board workload 
measure ranged between 6 and 72 directorships with a mean of 23, while the 
connectedness ratio ranged from zero, meaning that the directors sat on no other 
boards to 4.2, with a mean of 1, meaning that the average board comprised directors 
who sat on average on one other board. Weighted total shareholder return (wTSR) 
ranged from minus 260 percent to 690 percent with a mean of minus 10 percent. This 
means that these major 173 companies performed 10 percent worse than the exchange 
after making allowance for the risk levels represented by the industries within which 
they compete. Overall, the 2003 to 2004 year was a strong year for the ASX.  Over this 
period the S&P/ASX 200 index moved from 3,026.87 to 3,532.89, an increase of 16.7 
percent (ASX, 2004).  
To understand the relationship between these variables a correlation matrix was 
calculated (see Table 14).  As expected, there is a strong positive correlation between 
board size, total directorships and board workload. Of interest, there is no significant 
correlation between board size and board connectedness. In other words, larger boards 
do not necessarily have more connections to other companies once the impact of board 
size is removed. The important finding is that none of these measures is significantly 
correlated with wTSR. In short, neither the size of the board, the total number of 
directorships held by the board, the total board workload as calculated by the ASA nor 
the relative connectedness of the board with other boards is related to firm 
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performance, either positively or negatively. This is not to say, of course, that these 
boards do not make a difference – that is a totally different research question.  These 
findings demonstrate that these size and workload measures cannot predict firm 
performance as measured in a way that is meaningful to shareholders.  
 
INSERT TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE 
 
As a final test of the relationship, the correlations were calculated again 
controlling for the impact of company size. As the ASX is considerably skewed by 
size, with a few extremely large companies accounting for a high proportion of the 
total market capitalisation, it is possible that the relationships between board workload 
and firm performance could be mediated by size – that is, that larger companies 
perform either better or worse on wTSR and this effect drowns out the relationships of 
interest. To test this hypothesis, the natural log of total assets (LNASSET), with total 
assets being a measure of size, was calculated and then used as control variable in a 
partial correlation (see Table 15). 
 
INSERT TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE 
 
Of interest, the relationship between board connectedness and board size now 
becomes significant. Controlling for firm size, larger boards tend to be negatively 
correlated with connectedness, but connectedness is positively correlated with board 
workload and total number of directorships. However, none of the variables is 
significantly related to wTSR. 
In summary, for the period July 2003 to June 2004, for the largest 173 
companies on the ASX, there is no relationship between the total number of 
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directorships held by a board, the total work load of a board, the “connectedness” of 
the board allowing for board size and firm performance. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Defending the incidence of multiple directorships is not, of course, the same as 
arguing for directors to neglect their duties.  There is obviously a limit for any 
individual based on the particular boards on which they sit, their other commitments 
and their own personal abilities and limitations. There obviously can be situations 
where a specific individual can be overboarded. Even two positions may be too many 
if a company is in difficulty and a director has other major responsibilities in addition 
to his or her directorships.  Rather, the argument is that individuals play different roles 
on boards, and a key role for some directors can be their links to other boards. How 
then can a board and, indeed, an individual director, ensure that they are making a 
strong contribution and are not over committed?  The answer lies in a sound regime of 
board-as-a-whole and individual director evaluations. By undertaking regular, 
meaningful and rigorous evaluations, boards have a mechanism to guard against over 
commitment and general non-performance by individuals (Kiel, Nicholson and 
Barclay, 2005). 
Board evaluations are recommended by most guidelines and commentators. For 
example, the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003) in Australia, Beyond 
Compliance: Building a Governance Culture (Saucier, 2001) in Canada, the Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance (Combined Code) (Financial Reporting Council, 
2003) in the UK, and the Principles of Corporate Governance (A White Paper from 
the Business Roundtable, May 2002) (Business Roundtable, 2002) in the US, all make 
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specific recommendations for the regular review of board performance.  Similarly, 
commentators such as Jeffrey Sonnenfeld (2002) point out that even good boards can 
benefit from a properly conducted evaluation.   
Since the board itself is generally the only body with sufficient insight to 
comment on director performance, we suggest that evaluations are a key mechanism in 
guarding against overboarding.  Boards should undertake evaluations and make known 
to key stakeholders the processes they used and the implications from the process 
(ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003).  While the attendance data contained in 
the company’s governance report will provide a superficial indication of effort, general 
comments based on a sound evaluation program provide additional information to the 
market and ensure investors that the board reviews the performance of all directors and 
not just those with multiple directorships. Indeed, we suggest that, before a director is 
supported by the board for re-election, individual evaluation should be mandatory and 
should be considered by the nomination committee. 
In conclusion, our study focused on whether multiple directorships pose a 
serious problem for Australian listed companies.  We investigated the extent and 
nature of multiple directorships in ASX-listed companies in 2003 and the links 
between directors holding multiple board positions and firm performance.  The 
Australian Shareholders’ Association’s claim that there is a link between companies 
with difficulties and the workloads of boards is undermined by our findings.  In line 
with the extant literature, we find that there is no empirical evidence to support the 
ASA’s view.   
Our findings reveal that the incidence of multiple directorships in Australian 
listed companies is low.  Further, many of the apparent possible over commitments, 
  30
such as holding five or more positions, are due to related entities being listed on the 
ASX which share common directors. In these circumstances the workload is often less 
than that associated with directorships held in unrelated companies. Further, there does 
not appear to be any relationship between holding multiple directorships and firm 
financial performance.  This is in line with extant international studies on the topic 
(Ferris and Jagannathan, 2001; Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard, 2003; Harris and 
Shimizu, 2004).  One implication for boards of directors is that the number of 
directorships held by a director need not mean they will be unable to handle all their 
commitments.  It may well be that “busy directors are busy for good reason – they are 
good contributors (Harris and Shimizu, 2004: 793).  For regulators or policy groups, 
consideration of the imposition of limits on the number of board positions a director 
can hold needs to be carefully examined, so as to ensure governance recommendations 
and guidelines reflect the reality of corporate boards.  Likewise, investors should not 
see multiple directorships as the threat foreseen by the ASA. Directors with multiple 
board positions can, in fact, be an asset to a company in particular and society in 
general.   
There are three key flaws in any policy aimed at limiting the number of 
directorships an individual can hold.  First, it is conceptually the wrong level of 
analysis.  Second, it ignores considerable academic research that links director 
interlocks (i.e. holding multiple directorships) with superior performance.  Third, it 
neglects various systemic benefits of multiple directorships (i.e. the positive effects on 
our corporate system of having directors serving on multiple boards, such as the rapid 
transfer of knowledge concerning beneficial corporate governance practices,). 
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One important way boards can allay fears over director workloads is to conduct 
regular board and individual director evaluations.  Evaluations ensure that the board 
and its directors are able to carry out the roles expected of them and help promote 
corporate transparency and accountability. 
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Table 1:  Australian studies 
Sample 
Study Year of Sample 
No. of companies No. of directors 
Mean number 
of interlocks 
per firm 
Focus of study Key findings 
Hall (1983) 1971-1974 
1,200 publicly listed 
companies 
(excluding mining 
companies) 
2,030 5.6 Interlocking directorates 
Hall found that there was a significant 
level of interlocking directorships within 
the Australian economy. 
Stening and 
Wai (1984) 
1959 and 
1979 
Top 250 publicly 
listed companies 
1,599 
(1959) 
1,622 
(1979) 
2.5 (1959) 
6.3 (1979) Interlocking directorates 
Showed that both average board size and 
proportion of interlocking directorships 
increased over the study period. 
Carroll, Stening 
and Stening 
(1990) 
1986 Top 250 publicly listed companies 1,640 6.6 Interlocking directorates 
Found that the only 14% of companies in 
their study had no interlocks and that 
average number was up from Stening 
and Wai’s (1984) figure for 1979 (6.3). 
Alexander, 
Murray and 
Houghton 
(1994) 
1991 Top 250 publicly listed companies 1,755 4.43 Interlocking directorates 
Reported that the “big linkers” (people 
who held 4 or more directorships) 
accounted for only 1.8% of the number of 
directors, but 7.2% of the total director 
positions. 
Murray (2001) 1992 and 1998 
Top 30 Australian 
companies  Not stated 
Not stated Interlocking directorates 
Findings showed that there was not a 
dense pattern of interlocking directorships 
that would be expected given the finance 
capital ownership of the top 30 
companies. 
Kiel and 
Nicholson 
(2003) 
1996 
Top 500 publicly 
listed companies 
(460 companies) 
2,211 6.38 
Board demographics, 
including interlocks, and 
corporate performance 
Larger boards are associated with larger 
companies, more diverse companies and 
more heavily interlocked boards. 
Nicholson, 
Alexander and 
Kiel (2004) 
1996 
Top 250 publicly 
listed companies in 
Australia and the US 
1,583 
(Australia) 
5.89 (Australia) 
Structural social capital 
created through 
interlocking directorates 
Found that the smaller, sparser 
Australian corporate network is only 
marginally less compact than that of the 
larger US network. 
 
  36
Table 2:  International studies 
Sample 
Study Year of Sample No. of 
companies 
No. of 
directors
Focus of 
study Key findings 
Ferris and 
Jagannathan 
(2001) 
1995 6,089 US firms 37,774 Multiple directorships 
The incidence of 
multiple 
directorships is low 
and the number of 
directorships held is 
influenced by factors 
such as firm size, 
board size and firm 
performance.  
Ferris, 
Jagannathan 
and 
Pritchard 
(2003) 
1995 
3,190 US firms 
with total assets 
of at least $100 
million 
23,673 
Multiple 
directorships 
and board 
monitoring 
Determined that the 
evidence from the 
study did not support 
limits on the number 
of directorships held 
by individual 
directors. 
Harris and 
Shimizu 
(2004) 
1981-
1989 
143 US 
companies 
drawn from the 
Top 100 deals in 
Mergers & 
Acquisitions 
magazine 
Not 
stated 
Multiple 
directorships 
and 
acquisition 
performance 
The study suggests 
that boards with 
“overboarded” 
directors are able to 
make informed 
acquisition 
decisions. 
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Table 3: Average board size of ASX companies in 2003 
Category Average Board size Range 
Top 100 companies 8.2 4 to 15 
Top 200 companies 7.6 3 to 15 
S&P/ASX 200 7.5 4 to 15 
Companies in rank 201 to 
1250 
5.2 3 to 16 
All companies 5.7 3 to 16 
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Table 4:  The number of directorships per director for the Top 100 ASX-listed 
companies within the Top 100 listed companies in 2003 
Number of 
directorships Frequency
Percentage of 
people
Total number of 
directorships 
Percentage of 
directorships
1 534 81.4% 534 64.8%
2 85 13.0% 170 20.6%
3 29 4.4% 87 10.6%
4 7 1.1% 28 3.4%
5 1 0.2% 5 0.6%
Totals 656 100.0% 824 100.0%
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Table 5: The number of directorships per director for Top 100 ASX-listed 
companies across all listed companies in 2003 
Number of 
directorships Frequency
Percentage of 
people
Total number of 
directorships 
Percentage of 
directorships
1 381 58.1% 381 31.5%
2 130 19.8% 260 21.5%
3 69 10.5% 207 17.1%
4 45 6.9% 180 14.9%
5 15 2.3% 75 6.2%
6 8 1.2% 48 4.0%
7 7 1.1% 49 4.1%
9 1 0.2% 9 0.7%
Totals 656 100.0% 1209 100.0%
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Table 6:  The number of directorships per director for Top 200 ASX-listed 
companies within the Top 200 listed companies in 2003 
Number of 
directorships Frequency
Percentage of 
people
Total number of 
directorships 
Percentage of 
directorships
1 955 81.1% 955 62.6%
2 131 11.1% 262 17.2%
3 68 5.8% 204 13.4%
4 17 1.4% 68 4.5%
5 6 0.5% 30 2.0%
7 1 0.1% 7 0.5%
Totals 1178 100.0% 1532 100.0%
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Table 7: The number of directorships per director for Top 200 ASX-listed 
companies across all listed companies in 2003 
Number of 
directorships Frequency
Percentage of 
people
Total number 0f 
directorships 
Percentage of 
directorships
1 748 63.5% 748 37.9%
2 228 19.4% 456 23.1%
3 102 8.7% 306 15.5%
4 65 5.5% 260 13.2%
5 17 1.4% 85 4.3%
6 10 0.8% 60 3.0%
7 7 0.6% 49 2.5%
9 1 0.1% 9 0.5%
Totals 1178 100.0% 1973 100.0%
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Table 8:  The number of directorships per director across all ASX-listed 
companies in 2003 
No of 
directorships Frequency
Percentage of 
people
Total number of 
directorships 
Percentage of 
directorships
1 4317 78.95% 4317 58.8%
2 734 13.42% 1468 20.0%
3 235 4.29% 705 9.6%
4 114 2.08% 456 6.2%
5 32 0.58% 160 2.2%
6 20 0.36% 120 1.6%
7 14 0.26% 98 1.3%
9 1 0.01% 9 0.1%
11 1 0.01% 11 0.1%
Totals 5468 100.0% 7344 100.0%
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Table 9:  The number of chairmanships per chairman for Top 100 ASX-listed 
companies within the Top 100 listed companies in 2003 
Number of 
chairs Frequency
Percentage of 
people Chairs held
Percentage of 
chairmanships
1 73 85.9% 73 73.7%
2 10 11.8% 20 20.2%
3 2 2.4% 6 6.1%
Totals 85 100.0% 99* 100.0%
* AMP Office Trust falls within the Top 100 companies and had no director nominated as the chair. Source: 
AMP Office Trust annual report 2003 
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Table 10: The number of chairmanships per chairman for top 100 for ASX-listed 
companies across all listed companies in 2003 
Number of 
chairs Frequency 
Percentage of 
people Chairs held
Percentage of 
chairmanships
1 51 60.0% 51 36.2%
2 24 28.2% 48 34.0%
3 4 4.7% 12 8.5%
4 4 4.7% 16 11.3%
5 1 1.2% 5 3.5%
9 1 1.2% 9 6.4%
Totals 85 100.0% 141 100.0%
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Table 11: The number of chairmanships per chairman for the Top 200 for ASX-
listed companies within the Top 200 listed companies in 2003 
Number of  
chairs Frequency
Percentage of 
frequency Chairs held
Percentage of 
chairmanships
1 140 84.3% 140 69.7%
2 21 12.7% 42 20.9%
3 4 2.4% 12 6.0%
7 1 0.6% 7 3.5%
Totals 166 100.0% 201 * 100.0%
 
* Thakrall Holdings Ltd falls within the Top 200 listed companies and has 2 directors as Joint Chairman. Source 
Thakrall Holdings Ltd annual report 2003. Similarly GUD Holdings is shown with two chairmen. 
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Table 12:  The number of chairmanships per chairman for the Top 200 ASX-
listed companies across all listed entities in 2003 
Number of  
chairs Frequency
Percentage of 
frequency Chairs held
Percentage of 
chairmanships
1 114 68.7% 114 46.9%
2 39 23.5% 78 32.1%
3 7 4.2% 21 8.6%
4 4 2.4% 16 6.6%
5 1 0.6% 5 2.1%
9 1 0.6% 9 3.7%
Totals 166 100.0% 243 100.0%
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Table 13:  The number of chairmanships and directorships per chairman for the 
Top 200 ASX-listed companies across all listed entities in 2003 
Number of  
chairs and 
directorships 
Frequency Percentage of frequency
Chairs and 
directorships 
held
Percentage of 
positions
1 56 33.7% 56 13.8%
2 48 28.9% 96 23.6%
3 24 14.5% 72 17.7%
4 20 12.0% 80 19.7%
5 12 7.2% 60 14.8%
6 2 1.2% 12 3.0%
7 3 1.8% 21 5.2%
9 1 0.6% 9 2.2%
Totals 166 100.0% 406 100.0%
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Table 14: Board workload and performance – correlation matrix 
 Variable Mean S.D. N 1 2 3 4 
1. Board Size 7.5 2.14 173  
2. Board Workload 22.5 10.44 173 .511**  
3. Connectedness 1.05 0.67 173 -.055 .734**  
4. Total Directors 15.3 6.18 173 .630** .946** .704** 
5. Weighted TSR -9.87 111.67 173 .016 -.036 -.073 -.055
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 15: The effect of board workload on performance controlling for firm size 
Controlling for LNASSET 
 1  2 3 4 5 
1. Board Size  1.000     
2. Board Workload .326*** 1.000    
3. Connectedness -.232** .727*** 1.000   
4. Total Directors .473*** .925*** .701*** 1.000  
5. Weighted TSR .063 -.001 -.057 -.020 1.000 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
